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We propose an ontological theory that is powerful enough
to describe both complex spatio-temporal processes and the
enduring entities that participate therein. For this purpose we
introduce the notion a directly depicting ontology.
Directly depicting ontologies are based on relatively sim-
ple languages and fall into two major categories: ontologies
of type SPAN and ontologies of type SNAP. These repre-
sent two complementary perspectives on reality and employ
distinct though compatible systems of categories. A SNAP
(snapshot) ontology comprehends enduring entities such as
organisms, geographic features, or qualities as they exist at
some given moment of time. A SPAN ontology comprehends
perduring entities such as processes and their parts and ag-
gregates as they unfold themselves through some temporal
interval. We give an axiomatic account of the theory of di-
rectly depicting ontologies and of the core parts of the meta-
ontological fragment within which they are embedded.
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1. Introduction
Ontologies are recognized as being of importance in
almost all parts of computer science and engineering.
They are critical at least for the Semantic Web [6], for
data exchange among information systems [10], and
for communication between software agents [11]. An
important aspect of such applications is that ontolo-
gies need to be represented by means of formalisms
that guarantee certain desired computational proper-
ties. Usually Description Logics (DLs) are employed
for this purpose, since they are held to provide the op-
timal compromise between expressive power and effi-
ciency of the underlying reasoning [1].
T-boxes of Description Logics, i.e., the part of the
DL machinery which exclusively deals with classes,
when used to represent subsumption relations among
universals or classes such as living-being, vertebrate,
and human-being, are analogous to maps in geography.
Maps embody a specific type of simplified and there-
fore highly efficient representation of a certain part of
geographic reality. They represent individuals of geo-
graphic scale in their spatial relations to each other. T-
boxes, similarly, represent universals or classes in their
subsumption relations. In both cases the entities repre-
sented are considered as they exist at a certain moment
in time.
To conceive of a map, or a T-box, in these terms is
to conceive it as an inventory of things that exist at a
certain moment in time and of some of the properties
and relations that obtain between them. From a logical
perspective a map can be considered as a vast conjunc-
tion of sentences in a language that gives us the facil-
ity to express propositions about individuals of certain
simple sorts. A T-box, similarly, can be seen as a fast
conjunction of sentences expressing propositions about
subsumption relations among universals and classes.
Such languages are directly depicting in the sense of
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus [14,13]. This means that all
the terms in such a language refer to entities in real-
ity and the corresponding sentences consist, in effect,
of depictions of the arrangements of such entities: the
spatial arrangement of individuals in the case of maps
and the hierarchical arrangement of classes and univer-
sals in the case of T-boxes.
Directly depicting languages are, given their limited
expressiveness, not suitable for the expression of com-
plex statements about ontological structures. A map it-
self does not contain statements about how the map it-
self relates to reality. We argue here, drawing on ideas
set out in [8], that we need to distinguish:
– directly depicting ontologies (DDOs), which are
formulated in conformity with the principles of a
directly depicting language, and
– meta-ontology, which draws on greater expressive
resources and expresses (inter alia) properties of
and relationships between the different (directly
depicting) ontologies.
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Consider again the case of a map. Here some meta-
level information is attached to the map in the form
of scale, legend, and perhaps a label specifying the
method of projection. If you use the map then you pay
attention to these matters (which might be rather com-
plex) only peripherally. The focus of your attention is
rather on what is depicted on the map itself, on esti-
mating distances, making decisions as to which route
to take, and so on.
Similarly in the case of T-boxes. Here we have state-
ments like:
Pneumonia ≡ Disease u ∃hasLocation.Lung,
which describes pneumonia as a subclass of diseases
located in the lung. What cannot be described in a
T-box framework are the properties of the individu-
als which instantiate these classes or the properties the
hasLocation relation itself. As in the case of the map,
such information needs to be provided on a meta-level
in a language of higher expressive power.
Another problem is the static character of directly
depicting ontologies such as maps. For many phenom-
ena in reality are in one or other respect dynamic in na-
ture. Most phenomena in reality fall into one or other of
two disjoint classes of endurants, on the one hand, and
perdurants, on the other. Endurants are entities which
exist in full in every instant at which they exist at all.
Perdurants are entities which unfold themselves over
time in successive temporal parts or phases. This di-
chotomy needs to be reflected in our treatment of di-
rectly depicting ontologies.
We thus distinguish directly depicting ontologies of
two sorts:
– SNAP (for snapshot) ontologies, which represent
enduring entities (such as organisms, functions,
qualities, dispositions) as they exist at a certain
moment of time;
– SPAN ontologies, which represent perduring enti-
ties (such as processes, actions, events) from what
we can think of as a god’s eye (or atemporal) per-
spective.
In both cases we have ontologies employing very sim-
ple directly depicting languages. It is the purpose of
this paper to define a formal framework of meta-
ontology that will allow us to show how these two
types of ontologies are related together.
2. Entities and their location in spacetime
We first sketch that part of meta-ontology which
deals with spatial and spatio-temporal entities, their lo-
cations in spacetime, and their different modes of per-
sistence. We focus here on individuals. For a formal
treatment of universals and classes see for example [3].
For extended treatments of endurants and perdurants
see [2], [7] and [9].
We use a sorted first-order predicate logic with iden-
tity, and we assume that the domains of our mod-
els are divided into three disjoint sorts: regions, ma-
terial entities, and abstract entities. Regions are parts
of four-dimensional space and can be of any dimen-
sion (less than five), shape, and size. We use u, v,
and w as variables for regions. Spatio-temporal en-
tities, i.e., endurants, perdurants, and stages, are lo-
cated in spacetime. We use x, y, z as variables for
spatio-temporal entities. As variables for abstract enti-
ties, i.e., entities that are not located in spacetime, we
use α, β, γ, ω1, ω2, and ω3. Abstract entities include
directly depicting ontologies and their constituents.
All quantification is restricted to a single sort. Re-
strictions on quantification will be understood from
conventions on variable use. Leading universal quanti-
fiers are generally omitted.
2.1. Endurants, perdurants, and stages
Besides persisting entities such as endurants and
perdurants which exist at multiple moments in time,
we assume also stages which are instantaneous parts
of perdurants [12]. Particularly important are stages
which are instantaneous parts of the lives of endurants.
At every moment an endurant exists, there is a stage
which is the slice of the endurant’s life that is limited
to this moment in time.
As an example consider Figure 1. Instead of con-
sidering a four-dimensional model of spacetime, we
use the subset of points of the plane which is specified
by the coordinates t and s that satisfy the constraint
0 ≤ t ≤ t4 & 0 ≤ s ≤ 4. In set-theoretic terms we
write ST = {(s, t) | 0 ≤ t ≤ t4 & 0 ≤ s ≤ 4}.
The horizontal dimension in the figure is interpreted as
temporal and the vertical dimension is interpreted as
spatial.
The left part of Figure 1 shows an endurant, the
line-shaped entity A, at times t1, t2, and t3. The
life of the endurant A is visualized as the solid two-
dimensional region, LifeOf_A, depicted in the right
part of the figure. It shows that A comes into exis-
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tence at t1 and that it continues to exist until t4. The
lives of C, B and D are proper parts of the life of A
and are respectively located at the spacetime regions
loc_lf_C = {(s, t) | t1 ≤ t ≤ t4 & 1 ≤ s ≤ 2},
loc_lf_B = {(s, t) | t1 ≤ t ≤ t5 & 2 ≤ s ≤ 3}, and
loc_lf_D = {(s, t) | t6 ≤ t4 & 2 ≤ s ≤ 3} shown
in the right part of Figure 1. The life of A, LifeOf_A,
is located at the region loc_lf_A, which is the union of
the regions loc_lf_B, loc_lf_C, and loc_lf_D.
Both figures indicate that during its life A undergoes
changes in its mereological structure. We also include
in our model the following stages of the lives of the en-
durants A, C, B and D: At1 , At2 , At3 , Ct1 , Ct2 , Ct3 ,
Bt1 , and Dt3 . For example, At1 is the instantaneous
slice of A’s life at t1, At2 is the instantaneous slice of
A’s life at t2, and so on.
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Fig. 1. The endurant A in different time-slices (left) and the life of
A (right).
At a given moment during its life an endurant is ex-
actly co-located with the stage of its life at that mo-
ment. For example, the location of A at t1 is the loca-
tion of the stage At1 : the region loc_A_t1 = {(s, t) |
t = t1 & 1 ≤ s ≤ 3}. The stages Ct1 and Bt1 are lo-
cated at the regions loc_C_t1 = {(s, t) | t = t1 & 1 ≤
s ≤ 2} and loc_B_t1 = {(s, t) | t = t1 & 2 ≤ s ≤ 3}.
The stages At2 and Ct2 are both located at the region
loc_A_t2 = loc_C_t2 = {(s, t) | t = t2 & 1 ≤ s ≤
2). And so on.
We will use this example as a model for our for-
mal theory of stages, endurants, perdurants, and their
spatio-temporal locations.
2.2. The mereology of regions
2.2.1. Regional parthood
We start by introducing the binary predicate P ,
where P uv is interpreted as ‘the region u is a part of
the region v’. We also say that u is a regional part of v.
We add axioms which make P reflexive(ARM1), anti-
symmetric (ARM2), and transitive (ARM3), i.e., par-
tial ordering.
ARM1 P uu
ARM2 P uv ∧ P vu → u = v
ARM3 P uv ∧ P vw → P uw
We continue by introducing the binary predicates PP
for proper parthood (DPP ) and O for overlap (DO).
DPP PP uv ≡ P uv ∧ ¬u = v
DO O uv ≡ (∃w)(P wu ∧ P wv)
We then add an axiom stating that if everything that
overlaps u also overlaps v then u is a part of v (ARM4).
ARM4 (w)(O wu → O wv) → P uv
We then define spacetime as a predicate which holds
for a region which has all regions as parts (DST ). If
there is a such a region then it is unique (TRM2). Fi-
nally we add an axiom stating that such a maximal re-
gion exists (ARM5) and we use the symbol ST to refer
to it.
DST ST u ≡ (v)P vu
TRM2 ST u ∧ ST v → u = v ARM5 (∃u)ST u
On the intended interpretation in our example domain,
spacetime is the set ST. Region variables range over all
subsets of ST, and P is the subset relation,⊆.
2.2.2. Spatial regions and time-slices
We add as a new primitive the unary predicate SR.
On the intended interpretation SR u means: region u
is a spatial region. Spatial regions are parts of space-
time which are either not extended at all in time or, in
case of discrete time, do not extend beyond a minimal
time unit. In the example model, loc_A_t1, loc_B_t1,
and loc_C_t1 are all spatial regions. More generally,
any subset of ST consisting of points with a fixed time
coordinate is a spatial region.
Time-slices are maximal spatial regions. In other
words, a time-slice is a spatial region u such that u
overlaps a spatial region v only if v is part of u (DTS).
DTS TS u ≡ SR u ∧ (v)(SR v ∧ O uv → P vu)
In our example model, for any fixed t with 0 ≤ t ≤ t4
the set {(s, t) | 0 ≤ s ≤ 4} is a time-slice.
We add axioms requiring that any part of a spatial
region is a spatial region (AR1), every region overlaps
some time-slice (AR2), and spacetime is not a spatial
region (AR3).
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AR1 SR u ∧ P vu → SR v
AR2 (∃u)(TS u ∧ O uv) AR3 ¬SR ST
We then can prove that there is at least one time-slice
(TR1) and that any spatial region is a proper part of
spacetime (TR2).
TR1 (∃u)TS u TR2 SR u → PP uST
We can also prove that distinct time-slices do not over-
lap (TR3), u is a spatial region if and only if u is part
of some time-slice (TR4), each region is part of at most
one time-slice (TR5).
TR3 TS u ∧ TS v ∧ O uv → u = v
TR4 SR u ↔ (∃v)(TS v ∧ P uv)
TR5 P uv ∧ P uw ∧ TS v ∧ TS w → v = w
It follows from TR4 and TR5 that each spatial region
is part of a unique time-slice. Finally we can prove that
spacetime, ST , is the sum of all time slices, i.e., ev-
erything overlaps ST if and only if it overlaps some
time-slice (TR6).
TR6 O uST ↔ (∃w)(TS w ∧ O uw)
We define a temporal region to be any region that is
not a spatial region (DTR).
DTR TR u ≡ ¬SR u
TR7 TR ST
TR8 TR u ∧ P uv → TR v
We can prove that spacetime is a temporal region
(TR7) and that if u is a temporal region and u is a part
of v then v is a temporal region (TR8). In our example
model, loc_lf_A, loc_lf_B, loc_lf_C, loc_lf_D, and ST
are all temporal regions. Note that a temporal region
need not be extended in space. In the example model,
{(1, t) | t1 < t < t3} is a one-dimensional temporal
region.
Finally we can prove that u is a temporal region if
and only if it overlaps more than one time slice (TR9).
TR9 TR u ↔ (∃v)(∃w)(TS v ∧ TS w ∧ ¬v = w ∧
O uv ∧ O uw)
If desired a linear ordering on the subdomain of
time-slices can be added to the theory. With such an or-
dering we can say that one region temporally precedes
another, succeeds another, and so on.
2.3. Spatio-temporal entities and their location
The second sort in our formal theory are material en-
durants, perdurants, and stages, which we call spatio-
temporal entities. We use x, y, and z as variables for
such entities. We introduce the primitive binary pred-
icate L xu where on the intended interpretation L xu
means: spatio-temporal entity x is exactly located at
region u [5]. In other words, x takes up the whole re-
gion u but does not extend beyond it. We require that
every spatio-temporal entity is exactly located at some
region (AL1).
AL1 (∃u)(L xu)
We define that two spatial regions u and v are simulta-
neous if and only if they are part of the same time-slice
(DSIMU)
DSIMU SIMU uv ≡ (∃w)(TS w ∧ P uw ∧ P vw)
and require that no spatio-temporal entity is exactly lo-
cated at distinct parts of the same time-slice (AL2).
AL2 L xu ∧ L xv ∧ SIMU uv → u = v
We say that an entity is present-at a time-slice if and
only if it is located at a region that overlaps that time-
slice (DPrAt).
DPrAt PrAt xu ≡ TS u ∧ (∃v)(L xv ∧ O uv)
The distinct spatio-temporal character of endurants,
perdurants, and stages manifests itself in the different
ways they are located in spacetime. On the intended
interpretation the relation L xu holds for a perdurant x
iff u is the unique temporal region which x exactly oc-
cupies; for a stage x, L xu holds iff u is the unique spa-
tial region which x exactly occupies; for an endurant x,
L xu holds iff u is any spatial region that x exactly oc-
cupies at any time during its existence. In our example
model, the endurant A is exactly located at the spatial
regions loc_A_t1, loc_A_t2, and loc_A_t3 The perdu-
rant LifeOf_A is exactly located at the single temporal
region loc_lf_A. The stage At1 is exactly located at the
single spatial region loc_A_t1, the stage At2 is exactly
located at the single spatial region loc_A_t2, and so on.
We now define that a spatio-temporal entity is a
stage if and only if it is located at a single region and
that region is a spatial region (DStg). Stages are instan-
taneous spatial entities in the sense that they are con-
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fined to a single time-slice. A spatio-temporal entity is
persistent iff it is not confined to a single time-slice
(DPst).
DStg Stg x ≡ (u)(v)(L xu ∧ L xv → (SR u ∧ u = v))
DPst Pst x ≡ (∃u)(∃v)(L xu ∧ L xv ∧ ¬SIMUuv)
Consider the left part of Figure 1. The endurant A is a
persistent entity. It is located at the regions loc_A_t1,
loc_A_t2 and loc_A_t3 which are all parts of different
time-slices and therefore not simultaneous spatial re-
gions. The life of A is located at the region loc_lf_A.
Since loc_lf_A is a temporal region it does not stand in
the SIMU relation with itself. Consequently, the life of
A is a persistent entity.
We can prove that no stage is persistent (TL1) and
that if x is located at a temporal region then x is per-
sistent (TL2).
TL1 Stg x → ¬Pst x
TL2 (∃u)(TR u ∧ L xu) → Pst x
The sub-domain of persistent entities can be divided
into endurants and perdurants. We define that x is an
endurant iff x is a persistent entity which is only lo-
cated at spatial regions (DEd). On the other hand, x is
a perdurant iff it is a spatio-temporal entity which has
a fixed location that is a temporal region (DPd).
DEd Ed x ≡ Pst x ∧ (u)(L xu → SR u)
DPd Pd x ≡ (u)(v)(L xu ∧ L xv → (TR u ∧ u = v))
In our example, A is an endurant – it is located at sev-
eral spatial regions in different time-slices. The life of
A, on the other hand, is a perdurant – it is located at a
unique temporal region.
We can prove that endurants do not have a fixed lo-
cation (TL3), and that nothing is both an endurant and
a perdurant (TL4).
TL3 Ed x → (∃u)(∃v)(¬u = v ∧ L xu ∧ L xv)
TL4 Ed x → ¬Pd x
Thus the subdomains of stages, endurants, and perdu-
rants are pairwise disjoint. Finally we add an axiom
requiring that every spatio-temporal entity is either a
stage, an endurant, or a perdurant (AL3).
AL3 Stg x ∨ Ed x ∨ Pd x
It follows from AL3 that no spatio-temporal entity can
be exactly located at distinct temporal regions or lo-
cated both at a spatial and at a temporal region.
2.4. Lives of endurants
To tie endurants to perdurants, we define the binary
relation LifeOf to hold between an endurant and a per-
durant where, on the intended interpretation, LifeOf xy
means: perdurant x is the life of endurant y.
DLifeOf LifeOf xy ≡ Pd x ∧ Ed y ∧
(v)(L xv → (w)(O wv ↔ (∃u)(L yu ∧ O uw)))
DLifeOf tells us that perdurant x is the life of endurant
y if and only if x is exactly located at the sum of all
spatial regions at which y is exactly located. In the ex-
ample model, LifeOf_A is exactly located at loc_lf_A,
which is the sum of all spatial regions at which A is lo-
cated. Similarly, loc_lf_B, loc_lf_C, and loc_lf_D are
the sums of all spatial regions occupied by, respectively
B, C, and D.
Axiom ATP2 requires that every endurant has a life:
ATP2 Ed x → (∃y)(LifeOf yx)
We then can prove that no endurant has more than one
life (TTP2).
TTP2 LifeOf yx ∧ LifeOf zx → y = z
3. The mereology of spatio-temporal entities
3.1. Stages
We now define parthood among stages as follows: x
is a stage-part of y if and only if x and y are stages and
for all u and v, if x is located at u and y is located at v
then u is a regional part of v (DPst).
DPst Pst xy ≡ Stg x ∧ Stg y ∧
(u)(v)(L xu ∧ L yv → P uv)
In other words, stage x is a stage-part of stage y if and
only if the unique spatial region at which x is located is
a part of the unique spatial region at which y is located.
In the example model, both Bt1 and Ct1 are stage-parts
of At1 . The stage of my hand at this moment is a stage-
part of the stage of me at this moment.
We can prove that x is a stage if and only if x is a
stage-part of itself (TST1) and that stage-parthood is
transitive (TST2).
TST1 Stg x ↔ Pst xx
TST2 Pst xy ∧ Pst yz → Pst xz
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We cannot, however, prove that Pst is antisymmetric.
In order to force co-located stages to be identical we
add an axiom of antisymmetry (AST1).
AST1 Pst xy ∧ Pst yx → x = y
Thus, in our example model the co-located stages C t2
and At2 must be identical.
3.2. Endurants
The way an endurant endures through time is char-
acterized by its relation to stages in different time-
slices. In order to capture this mode of persistence we
introduce the binary predicate Ed-Stg xy (y is a stage
of the endurant x) if and only if (i) x is an endurant
and y is a stage; and (ii) x and y are both located at
some spatial region (DEd-Stg). It follows immediately
that Ed-Stg is irreflexive and asymmetric.
DEd-Stg Ed-Stg xy ≡ Ed x ∧ Stg y ∧ (∃u)(L yu ∧ L xu)
Consider our example model. Here we have Ed-Stg AAt1 ,
Ed-Stg AAt2 , Ed-Stg AAt3 , Ed-Stg BBt1 , Ed-Stg CCt1 ,
Ed-Stg CCt2 , Ed-Stg CCt3 , and Ed-Stg DDt3 .
We can prove that every endurant has at most one
stage in a time-slice (TED1).
TED1 Ed-Stg xz ∧ Ed-Stg xy ∧
(∃w)(PrAt zw ∧ PrAt yw) → y = z
Notice, that one single stage can be the stage of several
different endurants. Consider our example model. Here
the stages At2 and Ct2 are identical but this stage is the
stage of distinct endurants: A and C. Consider a statue
and the bronze of which it is constituted. The statue
and the portion of bronze, are distinct endurants which
have identical stages in some, but not all time-slices.
We add an axiom stating that wherever an endurant
x is located there exists a stage which is the stage of x
in this time-slice (AED1).
AED1 (Ed x ∧ L xu) → (∃y)(Ed-Stg xy ∧ L yu)
Because each endurant is located at multiple re-
gions, parthood relations among endurants are more
complicated than parthood relations among stages or
among perdurants. We now define a number of distinct
parthood relations between endurants: The endurant x
is a temporary part of the endurant y at time-slice u
iff there exists a stage of x which is present at u and
which is part of a stage of y (DP tEd ).
DP tEd P
t
Ed xyu ≡ Ed x ∧ Ed y ∧ (∃zx)(∃zy)
(Ed-Stg xzx ∧ Ed-Stg yzy ∧ PrAt uzx ∧ Pst zxzy)
The endurant x is a temporary part of the endurant y
iff there exists a time-slice at which x is a temporary
part of y (DP tEd ).
DP tEd P
t
Ed xy ≡ (∃u)P
t
Ed xyu
In our example model A, B, C, are all temporary parts
of A. All of my blood cells, my wisdom teeth, and my
beard are temporary parts of me.
The endurant x is a permanent part of the endurant
y iff every stage of x is a part of a stage of y (DP pEd ).
DP pEd P
p
Ed xy ≡ Ed x ∧ Ed y ∧ (zx)(Ed-Stg xzx →
(∃zy)(Ed-Stg yzy ∧ Pst zxzy))
In our example the endurants A, C, B and D are endur-
ing temporary parts of A as well as permanent parts of
A. Most of my blood cells and my heart are permanent
parts of me. My wisdom teeth (which were removed in
fact) are not permanent parts of me.
The endurant x is a lifelong part of the endurant y
iff x is a permanent part of y and every stage of y has
a stage of x as part (DP lEd ).
DP lEd
P lEd xy ≡ P
p
Ed xy ∧ (zy)(Ed-Stg yzy →
(∃zx)(Ed-Stg xzx ∧ Pst zxzy))
In our example the endurant C is the only lifelong part
of the endurant A besides A itself.
We can prove that P tEd, P
p
Ed and P lEd are reflexive
on the sub-domain of endurants and that P pEd and P lEd
are transitive. But we cannot prove that P lEd (lifelong
parthood) is antisymmetric. In other words we cannot
prove that if x and y are lifelong parts of each other
then they are identical. If desired, this can be required
with an additional axiom (AED2):
AED2 P lEd xy ∧ P
l
Ed yx → x = y
3.3. Perdurants
Whereas endurants have only endurants as parts and
stages have only stages as parts, perdurants can have
either perdurants or stages as parts. We define a binary
predicate PPd where PPd xy means: x is a part of the
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perdurant y. PPd xy holds if and only (i) x is a stage or
a perdurant and y is a perdurant; and (ii) for all u and
v: if x is located at u and y is located at v then u is a
regional part of v (DPP d).
DPP d PPd xy ≡ (Stg x ∨ Pd x) ∧ Pd y ∧
(u)(v)(L xu ∧ L yv → P uv)
In the example model, the perdurants LifeOf_B, LifeOf_C,
and LifeOf_D, as well as the stages At1 , Bt1 , Ct1 , and
so on, are all parts of the perdurant LifeOf_A.
PPd is reflexive on the subdomain of perdurants and
transitive. We can also prove that if stage x is part of
stage y and y is part of the perdurant z then x is a part
of the perdurant z (TTP1).
TTP1 Pst xy ∧ PPd yz → PPd xz
We cannot however prove that PPd is antisymmetric.
To require this we add the following axiom:
ATP1 PPd xy ∧ PPd yx → x = y
Notice that (ATP1) rules out the possibility of co-
located but distinct processes, such as the simultane-
ous heating and rotation of a metal rod. (According
to ATP1, the heating and the rotating would be differ-
ent aspects of the same process.) Thus ATP1 though
not untenable, is somewhat controversial and may be
not appropriate in every context. If desired it can be
weakened or eliminated (in this case, however, Theo-
rem TOB1 needs to be replaced by an axiom).
We then can prove that any stage of an endurant is
part of its life (TTP3); if endurant x is a permanent part
of perdurant y then x’s life is part of y’s life (TTP4).
TTP3 Ed-Stg xy ∧ LifeOf zx → PPd yz
TTP4 P pEd xy ∧ LifeOf zxx ∧ LifeOf zyy → PPd zxzy
4. Directly depicting ontologies (DDOs)
4.1. DDOs, constituents, and projection
We now consider directly depicting ontologies (DDOs)
as subjects of study from a meta-ontological perspec-
tive. Specific representations of such ontologies in-
clude maps, figures, lists of names, factory inventories,
biological taxonomies, engineering partonomies, com-
ponent catalogues, and so on. In this section we focus
on the relationships between directly depicting ontolo-
gies and their constituents. For example, if a DDO is
represented as a map, then the constituents of the on-
tology are represented as symbols/features on the map.
Between a constituent represented by a symbol for a
church, for example, and the church itself there holds
what we shall call a relation of ontological projection.
Intuitively, we can compare a directly depicting on-
tology, α, with a rig of spotlights projecting down onto
an orchestra during the performance of a symphony.
Each constituent of α corresponds to some spotlight
in the rig. Some constituents (spotlights) will project
upon single players, others onto whole sections of the
orchestra (string, wind, percussion, and so forth). One
constituent (spotlight) will project upon the orchestra
as a whole. Note that the spotlights do not hereby cre-
ate the objects which they cast into relief. When once
the rig has been set, and the members of the orches-
tra have taken their places, then it will be an entirely
objective matter which objects (individuals and groups
of individuals) are located in which illuminated con-
stituents.
Consider the map in Figure 2. Constituents of this
ontology are abstract entities represented by regions
that have the shape of corresponding federal states.
The relation of ontological projection then holds be-
tween the constituent represented Montana-shaped re-
gion (additionally labeled ‘Montana’) and the federal
state Montana, between the constituent represented
by the Idaho-shaped region and the the federal stated
Idaho, and so on. This relation of ontological projec-
tion is a generalization of the more familiar relation be-
tween a name such as ‘Mount Everest’ and the corre-
sponding mountain.
Fig. 2. A map of parts of the United States.
Consider the case in which the DDO is a taxonomic
structure of the sort that can be represented within a
DL T-box:
Fruit v Food
Vegetable v Food
Fruit u Vegetable v ⊥
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Here the constituents of the underlying ontology are
represented symbolically by means of either primitive
symbols or complex descriptions. Targets of their pro-
jection are universals or classes of entities in reality.
Projection is the semantic relation of assignment which
underlies the intended interpretation.
Having given these examples we will present a gen-
eral framework for classifying directly depicting on-
tologies and for describing the relationships among
them and their constituents.
4.2. Directly depicting ontologies and their
constituents
Directly depicting ontologies and their constituents
are abstract entities and we use the Greek letters
α, β, γ, ω as variables for abstract entities. We write
O α in order to signify that α is a directly depicting on-
tology. We introduce the primitive binary relation, CO,
which in our intended interpretation holds between di-
rectly depicting ontologies and their constituents, i.e.,
CO ωα is interpreted as ‘ω is a constituent of the di-
rectly depicting ontology α’.
We then add axioms stating that: if ω is a constituent
of α then α is an DDO and ω is not a DDO (AO1). It
immediately follows that CO is irreflexive and asym-
metric. We also require that no ontology is empty
(AO2), i.e., that every ontology has at least one con-
stituent, and that there exists at least one DDO (AO3).
(AO1) CO ωα → O α ∧ ¬O ω
(AO2) O α → (∃ω)CO ωα
(AO3) (∃α)Oα
We define that an abstract entity is a constituent if and
only if it is a constituent of some ontology (DCst).
DCst Cst ω ≡ (∃α)CO ωα
We then add an axiom stating that every abstract entity
is is either a DDO or a constituent (AO4).
(AO4) O α ∨ Cst α
We continue by introducing the binary predicate
Π ωx in order to signify that the constituent ω projects
onto the spatio-temporal entity x. We then demand that
something is a constituent if and only if it projects
upon (refers to) some spatio-temporal entity, i.e., con-
stituents project to entities and ontologies do not
project to entities (AO5). Finally we add an axiom en-
suring that every constituent projects onto at most one
entity (AO6).
(AO5) Cst ω ↔ (∃x)(Π ωx)
(AO6) Π ωx ∧ Π ωy → x = y
It follows that Π is a function from the sub-domain
of constituents into the sub-domain of spatio-temporal
entities.
An ontology α acknowledges a spatio-temporal en-
tity x if and only if there is some constituent ω of α
which projects onto x (DAckn).
(DAckn) Ackn αx ≡ (∃ω)(CO ωα ∧ Π ωx)
Consider again the map in Figure 2. The ontology
represented by this map acknowledges the federal
states Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Washington, North
Dakota, South Dakota, and so on.
4.3. Directly depicting ontologies of spatio-temporal
entities
Corresponding to the two different modes of persis-
tence – endurance and perdurance – we now introduce
two kinds of directly depicting ontologies: DDOs of
type SNAP, acknowledging enduring entities that are
all present at a certain time-slice; and DDOs of type
SPAN, acknowledging perdurants and stages, i.e., en-
tities that are uniquely located.
Formally we introduce a binary predicate SNAP and
a unary predicate SPAN. SNAP αu is defined to hold
between a directly depicting ontology α and time-slice
u if and only if every entity acknowledged by α is an
endurant that is present at u (DSNAP).
DSNAP SNAP αu ≡ O α ∧ TS u ∧
(x)(Ackn αx → (Ed x ∧ PrAt xu))
The unary predicate SPAN is defined to hold for di-
rectly depicting ontologies which acknowledge only
perdurants or stages (DSPAN).
DSPAN SPAN α ≡ O α ∧
(∀x)(Ackn αx → (Pd x ∨ Stg x))
We then can prove that no directly depicting ontology
can be both of type SNAP and of type SPAN (TSS1).
TSS1 ¬(SNAP αu ∧ SPAN α)
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Finally we demand that all directly depicting ontolo-
gies are either of type SNAP or SPAN (ASNSP1).
ASNSP1 O α → ((∃u)(SNAP αu) ∨ SPAN α)
ASNSP1 reflects the basic ontological distinction be-
tween perduring and enduring entities at the level of
DDOs.
5. Parthood in directly depicting ontologies
In the previous section we characterized constituents
of a directly depicting ontology as abstract entities
which project onto entities in the reality outside the on-
tology. DDOs, however, are not just collections of con-
stituents. They also have a structure, i.e., there are re-
lations that hold among constituents. Relations among
the constituents of a DDO are included in that DDO.
In this section we will show how relations between the
constituents of a DDO mirror the relations between the
entities to which they project.
DDOs are specific granular partitions in the sense
of [4]. The theory of granular partitions has two main
components:
– theory A concerns the way constituents of ontolo-
gies are organized into hierarchical structures (the
nested boxes in Figure 3).
– theory B concerns the way these constituent-
structures project onto reality (in Figure 3 indi-
cated by the arrows connecting constituents to
portions of reality).
Fig. 3. Relationships between constituents and entities.
Consider a directly depicting ontology of type SNAP
whose constituents target parts of the body of some hu-
man being named Tom. The DDO may present Tom’s
body as subdivided into head, torso, and limbs, and
Tom’s limbs as subdivided into left leg, left arm, right
Tom
Tom’s
head
Tom’s
torso
Tom’s
imbs
left
leg
right
leg
left
arm
right
arm
Fig. 4. Hierarchical subdivision of the body of Tom.
leg, and right arm. The representation of such a DDO
as a tree is given in the left part of Figure 4.
In this paper we make the simplifying assumption
that all relations among the constituents of a DDOs ac-
curately reflect relations among entities in the spatio-
temporal world to which the constituents project. Also
we will only consider representations of parthood rela-
tions. Notice, however, that other relations can be rep-
resented in DDOs. For example DDOs portrayed as
maps represent also topological relations like connec-
tion, tangential- and interior parthood.
The underlying reason for subdividing DDOs into
SNAP and SPAN ontologies has to do with the dif-
ference between parthood relations among uniquely
located entities (stages and perdurants) and parthood
relations among multiply located entities (endurants).
The SPAN ontologies represent a time-independent
view of the time-independent parthood relations Pst
and PPd among stages and perdurants. The SNAP on-
tologies give us a time-restricted view of the time-
dependent parthood relations among endurants. When
α is a SNAP ontology for time-slice u, then α repre-
sents parthood relations that hold among the endurants
acknowledged by α at u.
5.1. The sub-constituent relation
We introduce the primitive sub-constituent relation
, which holds between two constituents and an ontol-
ogy. On the intended interpretation ω1 α ω2 means
that ω1 is a sub-constituent of ω2 in ontology α. We de-
mand that if ω1 is a sub-constituent of ω2 in ontology
α then both, ω1 and ω2 are constituents of α (AOA0).
(AOA0) ω1 α ω2 → CO ω1α ∧ CO ω2α
If ω1 α ω2 holds then we also say that ω1 is an α-
sub-constituent of ω2.
We then add axioms ensuring that the sub-constituent
relation, when restricted to a single DDO, is reflex-
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ive (AOA1), antisymmetric (AOA2), and transitive
(AOA3), i.e., that is a partial ordering.
(AOA1) CO ωα → ω α ω
(AOA2) (ω1 α ω2 ∧ ω2 α ω1) → ω1 = ω2
(AOA3) (ω1 α ω2 ∧ ω2 α ω3) → ω1 α ω3
Using the sub-constituent relation  we define
the relations proper sub-constituent (D≺), constituent-
overlap (DO), and introduce binary predicates which
distinguish the root constituent (DR) and the atoms
(DAt) of a given DDO α.
D ω1 ≺α ω2 ≡ ω1 α ω2 ∧ ¬(ω1 = ω2)
DO O ω1ω2α ≡ (∃ω)(ω α ω1 ∧ ω α ω2)
DR R ωα ≡ CO ωα ∧ (∀ω1)(CO ω1α → ω1 α ω)
DAt At ωα ≡ CO ωα ∧ ¬(∃ω1)(ω1 ≺α ω)
The proper α-sub-constituent relation ω1 ≺α ω2 holds
if ω1 is a α-sub-constituent of ω2 but ω1 and ω2 are dis-
tinct. O ω1ω2α is the relation of α-overlap between
constituents ω1 and ω2 of the DDO α. The relation
R ωα holds if and only if ω is a root in the DDO α.
The relation At ωα (ω is an atom within α) holds for
constituents of α without proper sub-constituents in α.
In AOA4 we demand that for every directly depict-
ing ontology α there is a root constituent which has all
constituents of α as α-sub-constituents. AOA5 ensures
that if everything that α-overlaps ω1 also α-overlaps
ω2 then ω1 is a α-sub-constituent of ω2. AOA6 ensures
that every constituent of a given DDO α has at least
one atom as α-sub-constituent.
(AOA4) (∃ω)R ωα
(AOA5) (ω)(O ωω1α → O ωω2α) → ω1 α ω2
(AOA6) CO αω → (∃ω1)(At ω1α ∧ ω1 α ω)
We then can prove the following theorems. There ex-
ists exactly one root in every ontology (TOA1); if ω1
is a constituent of α and all atomic α-relative sub-
constituents of ω1 are α-sub-constituents of ω2 then ω1
is an α-sub-constituent of ω2 (TOA2). TAO2 is a spe-
cific version of what is called the principle of atomic
essentialism [15]. It implies that two constituents of a
DDO α are identical if and only if they have the same
atoms as α-sub-constituents (TAO3).
TOA1 R ω1α ∧ R ω2α → ω1 = ω2
TAO2 [CO ω1α ∧ (ω)(At ωα →
(ω α ω1 → ω α ω2))] → ω1 α ω2
TAO3 CO αω1 → (ω1 = ω2 ↔
(ω)(At ωα → (ω α ω1 ↔ ω α ω2)))
5.2. Projection onto reality
The projective relationship between constituents of
a directly depicting ontology and the entities in its tar-
get domain is complex. In the context of this paper
we focus on ontologies with particularly well-defined
projection relations. In a more general framework one
could, for example, give up axiom AO6, i.e., allow for
constituents that project onto more than one spatio-
temporal entity. One could also give up axiom AO5,
i.e., allow for poorly defined constituents which do not
project at all. For details see [4].
Given axioms AO5 and AO6 we know that every
constituent of a directly depicting ontology projects
onto a unique spatio-temporal entity. We now need to
ensure that the projection function Π preserves the sub-
constituent structure of each DDO. Intuitively: if the
constituent ω1 is a sub-constituent of ω2 within the
DDO α and ω1 and ω2 project onto the spatio-temporal
entities x1 and x2 respectively, then x1 should be part
of x2. Conversely, if the spatio-temporal entity x1 is
a part of x2 and x1 and x2 are projected onto respec-
tively by the constituents ω1 and ω2 of the ontology α,
then ω1 should be an α-sub-constituent of ω2.
However we need to spell out these restrictions dif-
ferently for SNAP and SPAN ontologies. We start
with SPAN ontologies. Recall that all constituents of a
SPAN ontology project to either stages or perdurants.
We demand that if (i) α is a SPAN ontology, (ii) ω1 is a
α-sub-constituent of ω2, (iii) ω1 projects onto x1, and
(iv) ω2 projects onto x2, then x1 is a part of x2 in the
sense of either Pst or PPd (AOB1).
AOB1 SPAN α ∧ ω1 α ω2 ∧ Πω1x1 ∧ Πω2x2
→ (Pst x1x2 ∨ PPd x1x2)
Conversely we demand that if (i) α is a SPAN ontology,
(ii) ω1 and ω2 are constituents of α, (iii) ω1 projects
onto x1, (iv) ω2 projects onto x2, and (v) x1 is a part
of x2 in the sense of either Pst or PPd, then ω1 is an
α-sub-constituent of ω2 (AOB2).
AOB2 SPAN α ∧ CO ω1α ∧ CO ω2α ∧ Πω1x1 ∧
Πω2x2 ∧ (Pst x1x2 ∨ PPd x1x2) → ω1 α ω2
For SNAP-ontologies we demand that if (i) α is a
SNAP-ontology for the time-slice u, (ii) ω1 is an α-
sub-constituent ω2, (iii) ω1 projects onto x1 and (iv) ω2
projects onto x2, then x1 is a temporary part of x2 at u
(AOB3).
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AOB3 SNAP αu ∧ ω1 α ω2 ∧
Πω1x1 ∧ Πω2x2 → P
t
Ed x1x2u
Conversely we demand that if (i) α is a SNAP-ontology
for the time-slice u, (ii) ω1 and ω2 are constituents of
α, (iii) ω1 projects onto x1, (iv) ω2 projects onto x2,
and (v) x1 is a temporary part of x2 at time-slice u,
then ω1 is an α-relative sub-constituent of ω2 (AOB4).
AOB4 SNAP αu ∧ CO ω1α ∧ CO ω2α ∧
Πω1x1 ∧ Πω2x2 ∧ P
t
Ed x1x2u → ω1 α ω2
We then can prove that if x is projected onto by the
constituents ω1 and ω2 of the ontology α then ω1 and
ω2 are identical
TOB3 CO ω1α ∧ CO ω2α ∧ Π ω1x ∧
Π ω2x → ω1 = ω2
It follows that the restriction of Π to a fixed DDO α is
a one-one mapping. In fact, it is an order isomorphism
to α’s target domain.
6. Conclusions
The theory outlined above contains the resources to
describe both complex spatio-temporal processes and
the enduring entities which participate therein. We ar-
gued that to deal with such phenomena we need a plu-
rality of directly depicting ontologies together with a
meta-ontological framework to deal with the relations
between them.
Directly depicting ontologies are granular in nature
and based on directly depicting languages. From the
constraints imposed on the structure of such ontolo-
gies it follows that computation about parthood rela-
tions within ontologies can be reduced to computation
in atomic lattice structures. A special class of atomic
lattices are finite lattices for which there exists a wide
variety of efficient algorithms for performing opera-
tions on such structures [1].
Meta-ontology, i.e., the theory presented in order
to specify what directly depicting ontologies are, how
they are related to each other, and how they relate to
reality, is more complex and requires expressive power
of full first order logic. The complexity of the meta-
ontology, however, does not add to the complexity at
the level of DDOs.
We distinguished two major categories of directly
depicting ontologies: SPAN and SNAP. These DDOs
represent orthogonal inventories of reality – one (SNAP)
acknowledging enduring entities, and the other (SPAN)
acknowledging perduring entities and stages. We showed
that the distinction between perduring and enduring
entities itself needs to be established on the meta-level
since it is outside the scope of directly depicting on-
tologies themselves.
Distinguishing between ontologies of types SNAP
and SPAN is also designed to take into account that
perduring and enduring entities behave differently with
respect to the type of part-whole relations that can be
represented within them: for endurants parthood rela-
tions must be represented relative to some time (-slice);
for perdurants parthood relations can be represented in
a time independent manner.
Due to their granular nature and and the separation
into DDOs of type SNAP and SPAN, the mereological
structure represented within a a given DDO is simpler
than the mereological structure on the side of entities.
However we showed that despite the inherent simplic-
ity on the side of the DDO important aspects of the
mereological structure of the represented domain can
still be captured.
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